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THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE ON
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY THEORY
FOREWORD: A BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE
FOR THE '90S
DANIEL L. KEATING*
Just under a decade ago, Vanderbilt University School of Law held its
Symposium on Bankruptcy and successfully brought together in one place
virtually all of the significant scholars in the field.' At that time the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 had been in effect for a little over five
years. Not surprisingly, most of the papers in that conference focused on
specific aspects of the new bankruptcy law.2
The landscape of the bankruptcy debate has changed markedly since the
mid-1980s, and so too must the character of a bankruptcy conference that
attempts to define the decade's thinking on the subject. In that respect, the
Washington University Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Theory demonstrated the evolution of bankruptcy scholarship
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Washington University. I would like to thank Lynn
LoPucki for reading a draft of this Foreword, but more importantly for being the one person most
responsible for the success of the Conference that is the subject of this Symposium.
1. See Symposium on Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 665 (1985).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments
of 1984,38 VAND. L. REv. 675 (1985); Frank R. Kennedy, The Discharge of Partnerships and Partners
Under the Banklruptcy Code, 38 VAND. L. REv. 857 (1985).
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on at least three distinct fronts: the players, the topics, and the format.
An interesting thing happened to bankruptcy law between the mid-i 980s
and the early 1990s: scholars other than law professors began to write
about it. Indeed, some of the most influential ideas concerning the validity
of bankruptcy law's fundamental assumptions have come from scholars in
the fields of business, finance, and economics.3 Reflecting that shift, this
Conference included participation not only by nearly all of the leading legal
scholars in the bankruptcy field, but also by academics in other fields who
have made significant contributions to bankruptcy scholarship. One of the
primary goals of the Conference, in fact, was to engage bankruptcy scholars
from different disciplines in a dialogue that would facilitate mutual
understanding of the particular insights that each discipline could bring to
the table.
In addition to a shift in some of the key players, the last decade has also
seen a significant change in the terms of the primary bankruptcy debate.
That change in focus is clearly reflected in a comparison between the topics
that were covered in the Vanderbilt Symposium and those that are the
subject of this Symposium. In one sense, the basic difference is whether
or not one assumes a world that necessarily includes a law regulating the
terms of bankruptcy.
During the 1980s, most bankruptcy scholarship assumed that we would
have a bankruptcy law, and therefore focused its attention on what
bankruptcy law's optimal terms should be. By contrast, in the 1990s and
in this Symposium, much of the fight revolves around the continuing
validity of that assumption. So, for example, there is now much ink spent
on the viability of such notions as "A World Without Debt"4 or "A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy."'
In addition to the players and the topics, the third defining feature of this
Conference was the format. Most attendees of academic or continuing
legal education conferences are familiar with a certain format: perhaps
three-quarters of the time will be allotted in advance for individual paper
presentations. Individual presentations will actually take up more than that
time as presenters run over without being stopped. This Conference was
different in two respects. First, only one-third of the time was reserved in
3. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 523 (1992).
4. Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994).
5. Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX.
L. REv. 51 (1992).
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advance for individual presentations from paper authors and commentators.
Second, tough but polite moderators6 uniformly enforced those predeter-
mined limits.
The decision to proceed with that format was admittedly a risky one.
Would the audience understand it? Would the authors and their egos stand
for it? It is singularly unfortunate that this Symposium, the written
rendition of the Conference, can never capture the resounding success of
the format choice. The beauty here was in the exchange-the two-thirds
of the Conference that had no script.
The quality of those exchanges was a tribute to the moderators, to the
participants, and to the limited audience that was invited to fill the
remaining seats in the eighty-person classroom that served as the site of the
Conference proceedings. The audience for this Conference deserves a
mention of its own. Consisting mainly of individuals personally invited by
the Conference organizers, audience members included an impressive array
of bankruptcy academics, bankruptcy judges, and nationally prominent
bankruptcy attorneys. In particular, the practical insights brought to bear
by the judges and lawyers in the audience served as a sobering influence
on some of the academic participants' more ambitious theorizing.
This Symposium presents the papers and commentary that served as the
basis for the lively exchange of the Conference itself. The Conference was
held at the John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, on
February 25 and 26, 1994. The Conference was sponsored by the
Washington University School of Law, and was funded in part through
grants from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges' Endowment for
Education and from the Business, Law, and Economics Center of the Olin
School of Business at Washington University.
I. WHOLE NEW WORLDS OF BANKRUPTCY
The opening session of the Conference had as its focus the proposal of
a whole new world of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law has always assumed
that claims against a firm's assets could be either debt or equity.'
Professor Barry Adler's article reexamines that fundamental assumption and
suggests interesting implications that flow from a change in that assump-
6. The three moderators were Lynn M. LoPucki, James J. White, and Elizabeth Warren.
7. See, e.g., I1 U.S.C. § 1 126(c)-(d) (1988) (distinguishing between a "class of claims" (debt)
and a "class of interests" (equity) for purposes of the requisite vote needed for a confirmable plan of
reorganization).
1994]
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tion.'
Professor Adler revisits and clarifies the "Chameleon Equity" theory that
he first introduced in an article for the Stanford Law Review.' The heart
of Professor Adler's Chameleon Equity theory is that the need for
bankruptcy reorganization disappears once we remove individual collection
rights from any claimant to the firm's assets. Professor Adler points out
that a commonly cited justification for the need for bankruptcy is to
overcome the collective action problem that exists under state collection
law. The collective action problem itself, however, directly results from
debtholders having individual rights to dismember the debtor when there
is a default.
Thus, says Professor Adler, if you remove the source of the collective
action problem, you can also remove the need for a costly and separate
system for resolving that problem. Professor Adler takes great pains to
distinguish his proposal from the "Contingent Equity" proposal advanced
by Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig in their Yale Law Journal
article."° Although the terms Chameleon Equity and Contingent Equity
both utilize the word "equity" preceded by an adjective, Professor Adler
argues that the two proposals could not be more dissimilar. Most crucially,
the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal does not purport to remove
individual collection rights from creditors who hold contingent equity
against the firm. Therefore, the Contingent Equity proposal does nothing
to solve the collective action problem that is a core justification for the
existence of corporate bankruptcy.
Two other articles in the Symposium, like Professor Adler's paper,
propose a sweeping change in bankruptcy law as we know it. An article
by Professors Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore explains their
innovative procedure for determining a company's future during Chapter
11. " One problem with current Chapter 11 procedure, according to their
article, is that it fails to separate issues of asset distribution from issues of
asset deployment.
Under the proposed procedure, once a company filed under Chapter 11,
the unsecured creditors would immediately become the equityholders and
8. Adler, supra note 4.
9. Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 311 (1993).
10. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter /1, 101 YALE L.J.
1043 (1992).
11. Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1994).
[VOL. 72:797
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/2
FOREWORD
the old equity's interest would be cancelled. These new owners then would
participate in a judge-supervised procedure in which parties would bid for
the company in bankruptcy, either with cash or with shares in the
postbankruptcy company. After a few months of bid solicitation, the new
owners would decide by a majority vote which proposal to accept, the
bidder would pay that price, and the company would exit bankruptcy in the
hands of the successful bidders.
The third article in this Symposium that proposes a "whole new world"
is perhaps the most radical of all: Professor Robert Rasmussen's "Menu
Approach" to bankruptcy." First articulated in his Texas Law Review
article, 3 Professor Rasmussen's approach advocates allowing each
individual firm upon its incorporation to select its own bankruptcy regime.
The argument for the Menu Approach is that different types of firms would
be best served by different kinds of bankruptcy rules, and that the best
world would be one in which bankruptcy rules could be tailored to fit the
idiosyncrasies of individual firms.
In his article for this Symposium, Professor Rasmussen provides a new
justification for his Menu Approach. The new justification is that the Menu
Approach would create the best system for reducing adverse investment
incentives inherent in the other major proposals for bankruptcy reform.
Professor Rasmussen readily admits that no one system of bankruptcy rules
can create the optimal investment incentives for all firms. It is precisely
for this reason, he argues, that firms should be allowed to select their own
bankruptcy regimes.
Although they do not propose a new bankruptcy scheme, Professors
Alexander Triantis and George Triantis explore the debt/equity distinction
that serves as the touchstone for many of the schemes that have been
proposed. 4 More particularly, they examine how the dynamic process of
financial engineering has blurred the traditional distinction between debt
and equity instruments.
In their paper, the Triantis brothers compare the convertible bond with
the puttable common stock. The former, in effect, is debt that may be
converted to equity, and the latter is equity with an option to convert to
debt. Though there is no real difference between them, different conceptu-
12. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Er Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994).
13. See Rasmussen, supra note 5.
14. Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design of Financial
Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231 (1994).
1994]
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alizations of each have led regulators to apply widely disparate rules to
these two financial instruments. In examining the two instruments, the
authors conclude that it is becoming less useful when making such
comparisons to do so under the traditional dichotomy between debt and
equity. Rather, given the nature of modem financial instruments, it
becomes increasingly essential to refer directly to the various financial and
governance features that are packaged in any instrument.
II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
Along with the trio of articles described above calling for a brand-new
bankruptcy system, a number of articles in this Symposium step back and
conduct large-scale assessments of the corporate reorganization regime that
we now have in place. In light of the "whole new worlds" described
above, it may be somewhat surprising that a number of these evaluative
papers conclude that Chapter 11 as we know it may not be so bad after all.
Several Symposium authors who undertake a global critique of Chapter
11 eventually conclude that the existing corporate bankruptcy system offers
a number of benefits that most bankruptcy critics have up to this point
failed to appreciate. Professor William Whitford's article epitomizes this
theme. 5 Professor Whitford begins his paper by suggesting that those
who offer alternative bankruptcy systems tend to exaggerate the costs of the
current system. He also points out that an untested system is often easy to
advocate because one cannot know all of the potential flaws of a system
until it has been tried in practice.
Professor Whitford then proceeds to discuss three underappreciated
benefits of the current Chapter 11 regime. First, he gives examples of
cases in which the availability of Chapter 11 has helped to facilitate an
orderly liquidation in a manner that would probably not have been possible
in the absence of the Chapter 11 machinery. Second, Professor Whitford
notes Chapter 1 l's distinctively positive role in enabling corporations with
a single large liability, such as a toxic tort, both to handle that liability and
to emerge as a viable going concern. Finally, Professor Whitford praises
what many others have considered one of Chapter 1 I's primary weakness-
es: the discretion that rests with the bankruptcy judges who are appointed
to administer the system. While Professor Whitford concedes that this
flexibility can be used unwisely, he argues that it can also enable judges to
find creative solutions in cases where an attempt to resort to a legislative
15. William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter 11, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1379 (1994).
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solution would almost certainly prove futile.
Professor John Ayer echoes in his paper 6 the last point raised by
Professor Whitford. Professor Ayer takes aim at those who would claim
to discern a single unifying theory that could explain all of the various
workings of Chapter 11. The beauty of Chapter 11, asserts Professor Ayer,
is its ability to accommodate simultaneously a number of apparently
conflicting aims. Indeed, concludes Professor Ayer, we want conflicting
things out of a bankruptcy system, and one aim of the system is to obscure
the existence of the conflicts.
Professor Douglas Baird explores the costs of corporate reorganizations
from a novel angle and concludes that these costs may not be as great as
many commentators have led us to believe.'7 Professor Baird begins by
challenging the commonly held assumption that a firm is not allowed to opt
out of its right to file a bankruptcy petition. The truth is, Professor Baird
asserts, firms can and do successfully undertake a de facto opting out of
bankruptcy. They do so, for example, by eliminating all institutional debt
from their capital structure.
Once we appreciate that opting out of the bankruptcy process is possible,
albeit at a price, then we can no longer assume that the bankruptcy system
can impose huge costs on its participants with no viable response possible
from the market. Professor Baird further observes that a firm could reduce
the cost of bankruptcy even if it chose not to eliminate the prospect
altogether. This would be possible, for example, by maintaining a
relatively simple capital structure, as is typically the case with a closely
held firm that is experiencing financial distress.
Professor Baird concludes by noting that an appreciation of how firms
can affect their costs of bankruptcy may enable us to focus bankruptcy
reform efforts in the proper place. Although much attention in the reform
movement has been on how bankruptcy affects distributional entitlements,
Professor Baird argues that perhaps the real focus ought to be on the costs
of bankruptcy procedures that cannot be as readily mitigated by firms in
advance of bankruptcy.
III. BANKRUPTCY EMPIRICISM: THE NEW FRONTIER
Rounding out the evaluative theme of the papers described above are a
number of Symposium articles that use empirical techniques to reach a
16. John D. Ayer, Through Chapter 11 With Gun or Camera, But Probably Not Both: A Field
Guide, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (1994).
17. Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72
WVASH. U. L.Q. 913 (1994).
1994]
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conclusion about the merits of Chapter 11. Professor Steven Kaplan's
article is one such example.' Professor Kaplan undertakes a case study
of a single large Chapter 11 debtor, Federated Department Stores. The
results of his study reinforce the notion that Chapter 11 is not as flawed as
some critics have charged.
Professor Kaplan's data consist mainly of comparisons of the value of
Federated's assets at various points in time, including before, during, and
after its stint in Chapter 11. From his analysis of these data, Professor
Kaplan draws a number of conclusions about the Chapter 11 process. First,
he points out that the indirect costs of financial distress (as opposed to
economic distress) may not be very high. Second, Professor Kaplan
suggests that in Federated's case the Chapter 11 process may have enabled
the company to effect a reorganization that ultimately increased the firm's
value. Finally, Professor Kaplan questions the wisdom of those proposals
that would replace the Chapter 11 process with mandatory auctions. In
contrast to the assumptions of these auction proposals, Professor Kaplan's
research on Federated suggests that, for at least some financially distressed
companies, the costs of the current Chapter 11 system are relatively low
and the benefits relatively great.
Professor Michelle White's article, which gathers the empirical research
of others and incorporates it into an economic model, provides an
interesting perspective on Professor Kaplan's paper on Federated.'
Professor White's paper focuses on Chapter 1 l's effectiveness as a filtering
device. Like Professor Kaplan, Professor White divides failing firms into
two categories: those that are not economically viable, and those that are
economically viable but having financial problems.
Professor White would not quarrel with the notion that Chapter 11 can
be beneficial for some firms, like Federated, that are economically efficient
yet still unable to meet their debt obligations. The problem with Chapter
11, asserts Professor White, is that it fails to distinguish between those
firms that are economically distressed and those firms that are merely
financially distressed. Thus, Chapter 11 can create needless costs to the
extent that it allows access to firms that are economically inefficient.
Professor White offers hypotheses both as to why managers of efficient
firms would have an incentive to make their firms appear less efficient, and
18. Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1103 (1994).
19. Michelle J. White, Does Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1319 (1994).
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as to why managers of economically inefficient firms would have an
incentive to make their companies appear efficient. She then uses an
economic model, along with results from recent empirical research, to
conclude that Chapter 11 as it exists today is not likely to serve as an
effective filtering device of the firms that are allowed to use it.
Probably the most sweeping empirical condemnation of Chapter 11 is
found in Professor James Bowers' article.20 Professor Bowers surveys
existing empirical research on the effects of the reorganization laws to test
various hypotheses that have been proposed by those who would defend the
existing system. The two main justifications for Chapter 11 that are tested
by Professor Bowers are, first, that Chapter 11 successfully rehabilitates
firms, and second, that even if Chapter 11 does not rehabilitate firms, it
redistributes wealth from some claimants to others in a socially beneficial
way.
In testing the rehabilitative hypothesis, Professor Bowers argues that not
only do the studies we now have show little rehabilitation taking place in
Chapter 11, but they also show that many firms in bankruptcy end up
relying on markets outside of bankruptcy to realize whatever value they
have. The irony in this, says Professor Bowers, is that these are the very
markets that the bankruptcy apologists have dismissed as viable alternatives
to bankruptcy on the basis that their transactions costs are prohibitive.
Professor Bowers explores how existing empirical research also
contradicts the redistributive explanation for the existence of the corporate
bankruptcy system. Existing research on the market values of creditor
firms before and after the bankruptcies of their borrowers shows that
creditors with high priority claims are not significantly affected, whereas
creditors with low priority claims are adversely affected. What this
demonstrates, says Professor Bowers, is that either bankruptcy does not
inherently effect a significant wealth distribution or, to the extent that it
might, creditors simply contract in advance around the wealth redistribu-
tion. Either explanation, he claims, contradicts those who would attempt
to justify bankruptcy on the basis that it effects a desirable wealth
redistribution among claimants.
After rejecting the above two explanations of the effects of corporate
bankruptcy law, Professor Bowers concludes by asserting that both
theoretical and empirical arguments support the conception of Chapter 11
20. James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing
Among BanAruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955 (1994).
1994]
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as a wealth-destroying system. The logical response, he says, is to repeal
Chapter 11 and let it be replaced with a market alternative.
A more narrowly focused empirical article is Professor Theodore
Eisenberg's paper on attorney fees.2' Professor Eisenberg examines data
on attorney fees that were gathered in a study by the American Bankruptcy
Institute and ultimately makes observations not only about attorney fees but
also about the skepticism with which we ought to view data that are
gathered by self-reporting.
Professor Eisenberg notes striking differences in the way in which
lawyers and judges view the same world of attorney fees. The differences
in how the judges and lawyers described attorney fee practices, Professor
Eisenberg says, could best be explained by the common human tendency
to view reality in a way that puts each of us in the best light. Thus,
judges' responses about how attorney fees were handled were more likely
than lawyers' responses to suggest that fee applications were handled fairly
and expeditiously. Similarly, lawyers' responses much more than judges'
tended to report lawyers as complying with the statutory requirements and
as not being greedy.
The larger lesson, suggests Professor Eisenberg, is to consider in any
empirical study the possible biases of those who are providing the
responses. Thus, when contemplating bankruptcy reform efforts, Professor
Eisenberg cautions that any purported assessment of reality as it currently
exists must always consider the lens through which that reality was
measured.
One of the most exciting Symposium articles on empirical research is
about a study that has not yet been done. Professors Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook used this Conference as the forum to
unveil their tentative research design for a five-year, $600,000 study of
business bankruptcies that will be funded by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges.22
Their articles describe their ambitious effort to create a data base for
business bankruptcies that will encompass cases filed under Chapter 7,
Chapter 11, and Chapter 13. The three researchers describe their intention
to cover business cases filed in 1994 in twenty-three judicial districts and
21. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Banknptcy Cases, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 979 (1994).
22. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 (1994); Teresa A. Sullivan, Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and
Business Reorganizations, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291 (1994).
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to follow those cases for five years. The results, they hope, will inform
policymaking about business bankruptcies that up until now has too often
proceeded without the aid of any comprehensive set of data.
IV. CONTROLLING MANAGERS OF INSOLVENT FIRMS
A common business reorganization issue that is addressed by three of the
Symposium papers is how to control the potentially opportunistic behavior
of managers in a failing firm. Two of these three articles focus more
specifically on the inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders that
heightens as a firm approaches and enters a state of insolvency. This
conflict is seen most clearly in a firm's investment policy, namely the level
of risk that a firm is willing to take in pursuing different investment
alternatives. Those caught in the middle of this conflict will often be a
company's managers, who on the one hand are often themselves large
shareholders, but who on the other hand may owe a fiduciary duty to
creditors whose claims are now at the margin.
Professors Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford examine this issue in
light of empirical work they have done on the behavior of large, publicly
held companies during reorganization.Y Professors LoPucki and Whitford
had reported in an earlier article24 that Chapter 11 managers tend not to
pursue optimal investment policies during the period of reorganization, but
restrict themselves instead to a middle-of-the-road asset-preservation
approach that the authors have termed "prudent investment."
In reconciling the conflict between a shareholder's desire to pursue high-
risk investments and a creditor's desire to pursue low-risk investments,
Professors LoPucki and Whitford argue that the prudent investment
approach is inherently suboptimal. In place of it, they propose a system
whereby management would be obligated to maximize the value of the
estate, and the beneficiaries of that policy would be obligated to compen-
sate those disadvantaged by it.
Professors Stuart Gilson and Michael Vetsuypens explore this same
tension between the investment incentives of shareholders and creditors of
insolvent firms.' The primary focus of their paper is how creditors can
23. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for
Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1994).
24. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993).
25. Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms:
Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005 (1994).
1994]
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seek to influence the firm's management in a way that is consistent with
the creditors' displacement of shareholders as the true claimants at the
margin. The article presents the results of empirical research which suggest
that creditors do indeed find ways to influence management policies. These
creditor influences, which are mainly brought to bear by banks and other
institutional lenders, include highly restrictive debt covenants, replacement
of senior management, and even changes in the form of senior managers'
executive compensation.
V. WHOSE INTERESTS SHOULD COUNT IN BANKRUPTCY?
Tangentially related to the question of who should have primary control
in a Chapter 11 reorganization is the question of whose interests should
count at all. An exploration of the parameters of that question is the
subject of two Symposium articles. Professor Karen Gross argues that
there should be room in the bankruptcy debate for consideration of
community values.26 Too often, she says, the terms of the debate have
been limited at the outset by an economic model which rejects any values
that cannot be readily quantified.
Difficulty in quantifying interests, however, should not be a basis for
ignoring such interests, she asserts. Relying on both feminist legal theory
and communitarianism, Professor Gross argues for a broadening of the
factors considered relevant in a discussion about the success or failure of
the bankruptcy system. Professor Gross challenges the premises that serve
as the basis for the traditional economic model, namely that individuals are
selfish, that tastes are exogenous and unchanging, and that utilities among
different individuals are impossible to compare.
Professor Kathryn Heidt explores the contours of what the bankruptcy
system considers to be a debt and in so doing argues that current bankrupt-
cy law fails to fit the reality of modem-day obligations. In particular,
Professor Heidt focuses on bankruptcy's inability to handle the long-tailed
obligation: the obligation which arises from acts performed in the debtor's
past but which fails to manifest itself until some indeterminate point in the
future.
Ultimately, Professor Heidt rejects a notion of debt that limits itself to
obligations reducible to money. She also argues that bankruptcy needs to
26. Karen Gross, The Need to Take Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
27. Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm of Debt, 72 'WASH. U. L.Q. 1055 (1994).
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recognize and account for the concept of a continuing obligation, rather
than merely asking whether an obligation can be traced to a past event or
transaction. Using the environmental harm context as an example of a
continuing obligation, Professor Heidt says that environmental creditors
ought to have both a prepetition claim and a continuing claim whenever a
debtor continues to own contaminated property.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY SCENE
In the Symposium's only international bankruptcy article, Professor
Douglass Boshkoff discusses the reasons for his pessimism about the
prospects for reform of the international bankruptcy system.28 At present,
the United States' bankruptcy laws include Bankruptcy Code section 304,
which suggests the possibility of a cooperative administration of a cross-
border insolvency estate.29 Professor Boshkoff points out, however, that
in practice this provision has been utilized mainly in cases where the
particular action taken would not substantially prejudice American interests.
Professor Boshkoff then gives a number of reasons, from national
chauvinism to differing countries' views of the fresh start concept, for his
belief that the universalist view of bankruptcy remains an unlikely prospect
for the immediate future.
28. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
19941
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